An owner in Fontana fires a delivery driver after checking his route logs against his timesheets. Six weeks later a demand letter arrives, and below the retaliation claim sits a defamation count aimed at the memo the owner relied on. Owners skim past it. His lawyer put it there on purpose.
Whether a fired worker can sue for defamation over the reason for a firing is now before the California Supreme Court. Here is where it stands, and how to build a file that holds up under either answer.
Can a fired employee in California still sue for defamation over why he was fired?
Right now, it depends on the judge. In Hearn v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 108 Cal. App. 5th 301 (2025), a divided First District panel set aside a $2,160,417 defamation verdict for a utility worker fired after a timecard and GPS review. The majority held that a terminated employee’s tort claim must rest on something other than the conduct behind the firing, and the damages cannot come only from losing the job. With harm unrelated to the termination, its conclusion “may have differed.”
The Supreme Court granted review on May 14, 2025 (No. S289581), limited to whether a fired employee may sue for defamation when the defamation contributed to the termination, or must proceed on a wrongful discharge theory. Briefing closed November 24, 2025. As of October 30, 2026, it sat on no argument calendar posted through November 3, the December list was not out, and no opinion had been filed.
Under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1), an opinion under review “has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only.” The grant order also allows citing it to show a conflict, so a superior court may pick a side. Hearn is an argument, not a rule.
Why do employees’ lawyers add defamation to a California firing case?
Because the firing itself is mostly a contract problem. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654 (1988), held that “tort remedies are not available for breach of the implied covenant in an employment contract.” Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 1174 (1993), struck a $120,000 fraud award against an employer that lied to push a worker out, calling such misrepresentations “merely the means to the end desired by the employer.” He kept his contract damages.
Recruiting fraud is different. In Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631 (1996), the lies “were not aimed at effecting his termination” but at luring him from a New York job, so relocation losses and punitive damages stayed available. Defamation is the other exit from Foley’s contract box. Hearn’s majority stretched Hunter to cover it; the dissent called defamation “a distinct harm, regardless of whether the tort is committed by an employer.” Neither side should call it settled.
When does Civil Code section 47(c) protect an employer’s investigation?
Usually, and it decides more small-employer cases than Hearn will. Civ. Code § 47(c) covers a statement made “without malice, to a person interested therein” by someone who shares the interest. In Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Federal Credit Union, 180 Cal. App. 3d 985 (1986), a report on a manager’s suspected kickbacks stayed privileged because only the committee, its auditor and the board saw it. King v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 426 (2007), protected managers’ explanations to directly affected coworkers, since nothing showed pretext or malice.
Malice ends it; Cuenca counts ill will, or no reasonable grounds for belief, as malice. In Hearn, the jury found malice and rejected PG&E’s privilege defense; the opinion notes the investigator knew a supervisor had approved the worker’s trips home but omitted it. The privilege failed on an omission, not on doctrine.
What can a California employer say about a fired worker to a new employer or the crew?
Less than owners assume. Section 47(c) reaches a reference only if it is “based upon credible evidence, made without malice,” and given “to, and upon request of,” a likely prospective employer. Lab. Code § 1050 makes it a misdemeanor to block a former employee’s reemployment “by any misrepresentation.” Under § 1053, a truthful reason may be given “upon special request,” and an unrequested one is prima facie evidence of a violation. Section 1054 allows treble damages, which Marshall v. Brown, 141 Cal. App. 3d 408 (1983), held mandatory.
I see more trouble in later remarks to the crew or customers. They did not produce the firing, so Hearn’s rule likely misses them even if affirmed. A charge of crime heads the list of spoken slander in Civ. Code § 46, and “stealing” is a charge of crime.
How should a small California employer document an investigation before a firing?
I treat the file like minutes for a board vote. It opens with the dated, written trigger and names an investigator with no stake. It holds interview notes, including the employee’s side, and the raw records, among them any approval for a personal stop. Findings read as facts (“entries on nine dates do not match the truck’s location”), not labels. A short memo from the decision-maker says what she relied on. If fleet software raised the flag, add the human-review record from my post on California’s workplace AI laws.
Findings go only to the decision-makers. At separation, give the reason once, in a letter using the findings’ words. A written reference policy should limit answers to dates and title absent a signed authorization. If severance buys a release, a mutual non-disparagement clause can bind managers too, but Gov. Code § 12964.5 voids any term barring disclosure of “information about unlawful acts in the workplace,” requires carve-out language, and requires notice of the right to consult a lawyer with at least five business days to do it.
How would this play out for an HVAC company in Rancho Cucamonga?
Illustrative facts: Lucia runs a 35-employee HVAC company in Rancho Cucamonga. In March 2026 a dispatcher reports a senior technician logging site time while his truck sits at his house. The office manager compares 60 days of GPS data with timesheets, finds nine mismatches totaling about 14 hours, and interviews two coworkers. Lucia fires him on April 10. A June demand letter alleges retaliation, citing his February complaint about refrigerant handling, and defamation, because the office manager told the crew he was “fired for stealing time.”
Under Hearn as it stands, a claim built on the findings memo mirrors Hearn’s own: the memo produced the firing, and if his only loss is the job, Lucia has a persuasive defense. If the Supreme Court reverses, section 47(c) carries the defense: the memo went to Lucia alone, so it is privileged unless he proves malice, and his lawyer will ask whether anyone approved those home stops. The crew comment is weak for Lucia either way: it came after the decision and turned a time-entry finding into an accusation of theft.
Retaliation is separate. Under Lab. Code § 1102.6, which Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 12 Cal. 5th 703 (2022), made the governing test, he need only show his complaint was a contributing factor. Lucia must then prove “by clear and convincing evidence” she would have fired him anyway, and a § 1102.5 loss adds a penalty of up to $10,000 per employee per violation, plus fees. A dispatcher report dated before anyone acted on the refrigerant complaint helps most, as does any record of firing others for padded time. Hearn’s jury found protected disclosures yet rejected his retaliation claim.
| Claim | Damages available | What the employee must show | Effect of Hearn today | If the Supreme Court reverses | Employer document that matters most |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Public policy wrongful discharge | Tort damages | A firing that offends fundamental public policy | None | No change | Dated trigger report |
| Lab. Code § 1102.5 retaliation | Damages, penalty up to $10,000, fees | Disclosure was a contributing factor | None | No change | Decision memo; equal-treatment records |
| Breach of implied contract | Contract damages only (Foley) | A good-cause promise and its breach | None | No change | Offer letter and at-will handbook terms |
| Defamation based on the termination reason | None if harm is only the lost job | False statement, plus malice to defeat § 47(c) | Persuasive bar if it arises from the firing conduct | Tort claim; privilege and malice decide it | Complete report, including helpful facts |
| Defamation in a reference or to coworkers | Tort damages; treble under § 1054 | Unprivileged statement, or a lie blocking a new job | Likely outside its rule | No change | Written reference policy and call log |
| Fraud in the inducement of employment | Reliance losses, punitive damages (Lazar) | A lie that induced taking the job | None; Lazar distinguished | No change | Recruiting emails and offer letter |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Hearn v. PG&E binding on California courts right now?
No. Because the Supreme Court granted review, rule 8.1115(e)(1) makes the opinion persuasive only, and a citation must note the grant. A trial judge may follow it or decline to.
Can I tell my other employees why someone was fired?
Often, if you tell only those who need to know and stick to provable facts. King v. United Parcel Service treated statements to directly affected coworkers as privileged. Labels like “thief” put that at risk.
What should I say when another company calls for a reference?
Many employers confirm dates and title only unless the former employee signs an authorization. Anything more should be truthful and given only on request, since Labor Code section 1054 trebles damages for a misrepresentation that blocks a new job.
Does a non-disparagement clause stop a fired employee from talking about the firing?
Not entirely. Government Code section 12964.5 voids any separation agreement term that bars disclosing information about unlawful acts in the workplace. A mutual clause can still limit what managers say.
What changes for employers if the Supreme Court rules for the employee?
Defamation claims tied to the termination reason would proceed as torts. The fight would then turn on privilege and malice, which means on how complete your file is.
How North Star Law Firm Can Help
North Star Law Firm reviews separation agreements and reference policies for California employers through its contract drafting and review practice, and drafts the operating and shareholder agreements that set how an owner-employee of a family company can be removed. Phillip Zagotti is a California attorney and a CPA whose forensic accounting work includes reconciling time and location records; see the firm’s business and contract law page.
Before a firing, or once a demand letter arrives, contact North Star Law Firm or schedule a consultation.
